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Abstract
Structural changes in US agriculture toward a more corporate-oriented and vertically aligned
system have focused attention on the relative efficacy of the anti-corporate farming laws of
nine Midwestern states. Using state-level data from a survey of agricultural lawyers and the
U.S. Census of Agriculture, we find that the restrictiveness of the laws vary among states,
and the relative restrictiveness of the laws have changed over time. Also, strengthening a law
tends to limit acreage under non-family corporate ownership arrangements.  2001 Elsevier
Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
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Introduction
Recent changes in US agriculture toward a vertically integrated structure have
prompted debates over the appropriate role of corporations in agriculture. These
debates have focused attention on the anti-corporate farming laws of nine contiguous
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Midwestern states: Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota,
Oklahoma, South Dakota, and Wisconsin. The state laws of interest are labeled “anti-
corporate” because, for the most part, they “provide that corporations or other invest-
ment type entities shall not engage in farming, nor shall they directly or indirectly
own or otherwise acquire interests in agricultural land” (Pedersen and Meyer, 1995:
45). Taken together the states form a kind of anti-corporate farming zone in the
central section of the US.
The laws were put in place starting in the early seventies. The laws were designed
to promote family-owned farming operations through limiting the role of corpora-
tions in agricultural production. For example, Minnesota’s anti-corporate farming
law specifically states that it is in the interests of the state to promote and protect:
“the family farm as a basic economic unit, to insure it as the most socially desir-
able mode of agricultural production, and to enhance and promote the stability
and well-being of rural society in Minnesota and the nuclear family.”
The laws were also enacted in response to fears that agribusiness conglomerates
might gain control of production and marketing of a substantial portion of the food
supply, and so be able to control prices and boost profits (Welsh, 1998).
The design of the laws vary between states. However, in general the laws create
a hierarchy of regulation of ownership arrangements in agriculture. Non-family cor-
porations are the most likely to have their activities restricted under anti-corporate
farming laws. Family corporations, partnership arrangements and sole proprietorships
have fewer or no restrictions placed on them. One of the more common restrictions
placed on non-family corporate farms or other regulated entities is a cap on acres
of land owned (Welsh, 1998).
With the exception of Nebraska, whose constitutional amendment came into effect
in 1982, the states had their laws in place by 1975. However, the laws have changed
over time. Missouri’s law was relaxed in 1993 to allow Premium Standard Farms
to establish operations in part of the state, Oklahoma “clarified” its law in 1991 to
attract more corporate investment in agriculture, and in 1995, Kansas began to allow
counties to exempt themselves from its law (Hamilton, 1995). In 1988 and 1998
South Dakota placed more restrictions on corporate farms.
Despite efforts to establish, strengthen or relax such laws, we found no systematic
evaluation of the overall efficacy of the laws, nor if differences between states’ laws,
and changes in the laws, have had measurable impacts. In this paper we investigated
the potential impact of the laws. Specifically, we attempted to discern what impact,
if any, restrictions on non-family corporations have had, at the state level, on: (1)
the percentage of acres owned by non-family corporations; and (2) the overall per-
centage of non-family corporate farms.
Data and methods
Data was gathered from the US Census of Agriculture for 1987 and 1997 on
percentage of land owned by non-family corporate farms and overall percentages of
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non-family corporate farms for anti-corporate farming states (AC states) and a num-
ber of other central states (OC states): Montana, Wyoming, Colorado, New Mexico,
Texas, Arkansas, Kentucky, Tennessee, Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, and Michigan. The
criteria used for choosing OC states was whether a state bordered a state with an
anti-corporate law, or was considered part of the Corn Belt region. In this way we
attempted to control for the type of agriculture practiced, in order to isolate the
possible impacts of the laws.1 In 1997 in AC states, the average percentage of farms
that were non-family corporations was 0.28%, with acreage averaging about 1.82%.
In OC states the figures were 0.41% and 0.94%, respectively.
To construct an index of the laws’ restrictiveness over time we surveyed agricul-
tural lawyers deemed by their peers as experts on anti-corporate farming laws. To
obtain the names of the agricultural lawyers, we initially identified knowledgeable
informants and queried them as to a list of experts. Each of these experts were
subsequently contacted and asked for a list of experts. This iterative process con-
tinued until a “core” group of 19 experts were identified. This type of purposive
sampling is a common qualitative research methodology. It is useful for identifying
and gathering data from small groups of people with specialized knowledge, experi-
ences, or insight (Patton, 1990). Nineteen surveys were mailed and 15 complete
and usable surveys were returned. The surveyed lawyers worked in private practice,
academia and non-governmental organizations interested in agricultural policy.
Respondents rated the laws from 1 to 5 for each year the laws were in effect from
1974 to 1997. This time period was chosen to coincide with the establishment of
the laws (laws were in place by 1975 except for Nebraska’s in 1982). Lower ratings
indicate less restrictiveness. The results are the weighted averages of the respondents’
ratings for each state. The restrictiveness ratings are presented in Table 1.
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression analysis was performed using the follow-
ing models.
PctChngAcres87-97=(ChangeRestrict87-97, Region, PctAcres87)
PctChngFarms87-97=(ChangeRestrict87-97, Region, PctFarms87)
where, PctChngAcres87-97 is the percentage change in acres under non-family cor-
porate farms from 1987 to 1997; and, PctChngFarms87-97 is the percentage change
in non-family corporate farms from 1987 to 1997. ChangeRestrict87-97 is the restric-
1 An analysis by Sommer and Hines (1991: 5) illustrates that this approach has validity since the major
farming systems in the anti-corporate states are similar to the systems in the states bordering the anti-
corporate states and the Corn Belt states. We also analyzed data from the 1997 Census of Agriculture in
which we compared percentages of farm types (beef, broiler poultry, dairy, hog, sheep, corn, sorghum,
wheat, oat, soybean, nursery crops, and vegetable crops) identified by Sommer and Hines (1991) as
components of the major commodity systems for the states within the two groups. The percentages of
these farm types for the anti-corporate states and other central states tend to be similar. Mean percentages
of the farms growing the above crops for the states in the two groups were not statistically different at
the 0.05 level for all the commodities, except percentages of farms raising oats and nursery crops. Mean
state percentages of oat farms and nursery farms were less than 10% and less than 1%, respectively, for
both groups of states.
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tiveness rating (from Table 1) in 1997 minus the rating in 1987. Since the significant
changes in the laws were made between 1988 and 1995, and since the laws’ ratings
primarily moved either up or down, but not both, between 1987 and 1997, the end
points are representative of the time period. For OC states this variable would have
a zero value. Region is a binary (0,1) variable where AC states are coded as 1 and
OC states as 0. PctAcres87 is the percentage of acres under non-family corporate
farms in 1987; and PctFarms87 is the percentage of non-family corporate farms in
1987. The latter two variables control for the differences between states regarding
corporate acres and farms at the start of the period of interest. The restrictiveness
rating for 1987 is not included as a control variable because it is highly correlated
with Region.
The 1987–1997 time period was chosen to coincide with the availability of US
Census data, because the last law was in place by 1982 and because after 1987,
significant changes were made in the laws in several states. The dependent variables
were selected because the laws were designed such that non-family corporations
were more likely to have restrictions placed on them, and acreage limits have been
one of the most common restrictions.
Results and conclusions
Turning first to the mail survey results in Table 1, most of the laws were rated
as mildly to fairly restrictive by the agricultural lawyers. No laws were rated as very
restrictive, and two of nine state laws were rated as at least fairly restrictive over
the life of their laws — Nebraska and North Dakota. In addition, Table 1 indicates
that from 1987 to 1997 the mean restrictiveness rating of all the laws dropped from
2.8 to 2.55, and the difference between the highest rated law and the lowest also
increased — 1.8 to 2.1. That is, the perceived restrictiveness of the laws in general
has declined slightly and there has been increasing variation between state laws. For
example, the restrictiveness ratings of Missouri, Oklahoma and Kansas declined to
reflect changes made by the state legislatures. Specifically, Oklahoma’s “clarifi-
cation” of its law to attract corporate investment resulted in its rating dropping from
2.7 to 1.8 from 1990 to 1991. Contrariwise, South Dakota strengthened its law in
1988, which was also reflected by an increase in the average rating from 1987 to
1988 2.7 to 3.0.
Turning to Table 2, the OLS results indicate that changes in the restrictiveness ratings
significantly influence changes in acres under non-family corporate farms. Higher values
of the index measuring changes in the laws’ restrictiveness (i.e., strengthening the laws)
were negatively related to changes in acres under non-family corporate ownership
arrangements. That is, strengthening anti-corporate farming laws made it more likely a
state would witness reductions, or smaller increases, in land under non-family corporate
farms. Contrariwise, weakening laws had a positive impact on acres under non-family
corporate ownership arrangements. Region had no impact.
Interestingly, the results regarding percent changes in non-family corporate farms
indicate that strengthening a law has a positive effect on the percentage change in
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Table 2
OLS Regression Results: Percentage change in non-family corporate farms and acres from 1987 to 1997a
Explanatory Variable Acres Farms
Change in laws’ restrictiveness 6.957** 0.303a
(2.404) (0.160)
Anti-corporate farming state 0.703 -0.019
(1.723) (0.106)
Percentage of non-family 1.514 —
farm acres in 1987 (88.376)
Percentage of non-family — 135.227**
farms in 1987 (38.901)
Intercept 0.004 0.886**
(1.346) (0.127)
F 3.92 4.84
Adj R2 0.32 0.37
a p 0.10; *=p 0.05; **=p 0.01.
non-family corporate farms, though the relationship is not strong (p0.10). This
seems counter intuitive. However, an earlier legal analysis by Dahl (1991) indicates
that some parties might try to circumvent the acreage limitations in the laws by
establishing more than one corporation. Stronger laws, which limit corporate farm
size, may provide an incentive to establish more corporate farms.
In conclusion, anti-corporate farming laws have been effective, if effectiveness is
defined as limiting the acreage under non-family corporate ownership arrangements.
These results help explain the continuing debates and efforts to establish, strengthen
and weaken this type of law. Since changes in the laws have real effects, there is a
basis for people who disagree on the appropriate role of corporations in agriculture
to conflict over the need for the laws. Based on the results from this analysis, state
governments and citizens have clear policy options. If the citizenry wishes to limit
the expansion of farm land under non-family corporate ownership arrangements, then
using the laws of states such as Nebraska or perhaps South Dakota, as models is
advised. On the other hand, if corporate expansion is a goal, then states with anti-
corporate laws should follow the lead of other states such as Oklahoma or Missouri
and weaken the laws.
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